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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
Protests in Russia: 
Supporting Systemic 
Change Prior to  
2020’s Elections
Russia postponed its national vote 
on constitutional changes to July 1, 
2020. Due to restrictions on free-
dom of movement and assembly from 
COVID-19, mass protests are unlike-
ly to result. Nevertheless, manag-
ing growing social discontent may 
well be the Kremlin’s next big chal-
lenge as it prepares for September’s 
regional and parliamentary elections. 
Given its upcoming EU presidency 
and Council of Europe chairmanship, 
Germany could make a positive dif-
ference in protecting human rights 
and EU values in Russia.
A wave of more than 12,000 recur-
ring demonstrations in Moscow and 
other regions has made 2019 to 2020 
the most intensive point of protest in 
Russia’s recent history. Though the 
COVID-19 crisis coincidentally helped 
the Kremlin to lower the potential for 
protest, it could not make ongoing 
demonstrations disappear. Dissatisfac-
tion among the Russian population is 
growing and posing a significant chal-
lenge to the Kremlin, especially due 
to the upcoming plebiscite on con-
stitutional amendments on July 1 and 
regional elections on September 13, 
2020. While the protests are unlike-
ly to bring about any systemic change, 
Germany and the EU could, however, 
certainly contribute to the improve-
ment of the worsening human rights 
situation in Russia.
COVID-19 COULD NOT 
UNDERMINE THE TREND 
OF MASS PROTEST
As many European countries affected 
by the coronavirus crisis, Russia im-
posed a ban on holding public events 
during the pandemic; but it also con-
stricted freedom of speech by adopt-
ing a national law to stop the spread 
of fake news on COVID-19. The ban on 
public events was adopted by regional 
authorities, and it differed from region 
to region. Some allowed a maximum of 
50 participants, others allowed for up 
to 100 or 1,000 people to gather. While 
protests against upcoming constitu-
tional amendments that enable Presi-
dent Vladimir Putin to remain in power 
longer were allowed in cities such as 
Perm, Chita, and Omsk even as late 
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as the end of March, other places im-
posed a complete ban.
In Moscow and Saint Petersburg, the 
ban affected all protests regardless of 
their scope, including single-person 
pickets. These were the only type of 
protest that did not require the prior 
consent of the authorities. After prom-
inent journalist and Moscow legisla-
tor Ilya Azar was jailed on May 28 after 
holding a solo picket despite Moscow 
Mayor Sergey Sobyanin’s ban on public 
events, a series of peaceful single pro-
tests occurred all over Russia. The solo 
pickets held in solidarity with Azar 
ended in more arrests and attracted 
international attention. Council of Eu-
rope Human Rights Commissioner 
Dunja Mijatovic stated that “COVID-19 
cannot be an excuse to clamp down on 
freedom of expression.”
While the coronavirus lockdown gave 
authorities in Moscow and several 
other Russian regions the perfect op-
portunity to test new QR systems for 
the digital surveillance of freedom of 
movement, it also gave birth to new 
and creative forms of digital protest. 
For example, on Yandex Maps – the 
Russian alternative to Google Maps 
and the most detailed cartographic 
service in the country – users staged 
virtual protests against self-isolation 
by blocking virtual traffic or by drop-
ping pins near local governmental 
buildings and writing messages with 
demands (see image).
When taken as a whole and compared 
to the rallies that took place from 2011 
to 2013, the latest demonstrations in-
dicate deeper changes in Russian so-
ciety, particularly at the regional level. 
Even if taking to the streets does not 
bring about any overarching politi-
cal change, protesters are develop-
ing the skills to organize themselves 
into groups and promote their own 
agenda by means of publicly express-
ing their discontent. Their progress is 
best proven by the release of journalist 
Ivan Golunov and political science stu-
dent Egor Zhukov in 2019 in response 
to the public outcry that followed their 
arrests on fabricated charges. The joint 
“NO!” campaign against constitution-
al change, which is already supported 
by almost 300 regional and munici-
pal deputies, is another issue that the 
Kremlin has to address.
THE PROTESTS ARE STILL 
FRAGMENTED AND SMALL
By suppressing demonstrations and ig-
noring the underlying problems that in-
cite them, the Russian government has 
only increased tensions and further po-
liticized protest actions. Still, neither 
an All-Russian protest movement nor a 
single agenda item that could unite re-
gional activities has emerged. In 2018, 
protests against increasing the retire-
ment age had a chance of becoming a 
unifying element on the national level, 
but the protesters’ aspirations vanished 
right after pension reform was adopt-
ed. Currently, wider protest agendas 
are diverse: there are, to cite only two 
prominent examples, protests against 
the isolation of the Russian internet and 
environmental actions against Mos-
cow’s waste disposal policies that af-
fect other regions. Although protests 
in the capital in the summer of 2019 
against the authorities’ politically-mo-
tivated rejection of independent candi-
dates from its City Duma election were 
attended by 22,000 to 60,000 people 
(according to different assessments) 
and continue today, these numbers 
still only represent a small percentage 
of the megapolis’ population of twelve 
million. While these demonstrations 
provoked some sympathetic respons-
es throughout Russia, the issues that 
caused them mostly remain a concern 
for Muscovites.
The geographic diversification of pro-
tests is, however, an interesting trend. 
While in the early 2010s Moscow and 
Saint Petersburg were the main cen-
ters of protest, there are now more 
protests in Russia’s regions than in its 
capital. The agendas of these regional 
demonstrations also differ widely from 
their urban counterparts in that they 
are centered around socio-econom-
ic, regional, and local issues. Typical 
examples include defending a small 
park against the construction of a new 
church in Yekaterinburg, protesting 
a territorial dispute with Chechnya 
in Ingushetia, and demonstrating 
A virtual protest on Yandex Maps in which users dropped pins near local governmental 
buildings and wrote demands such as, shown here, “Feed my kids and I stay home”
Source: Donnews.ru https://www.donnews.ru/V-Rostove-proshel-pervyy-v-istorii- 
goroda-virtualnyy-miting_106391
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against the construction of a landfill 
near the village of Shies in the region 
of Arkhangelsk.
In terms of age groups, according to 
recent polls by the Levada Analytical 
Center, the majority of Russian youth 
remains apolitical despite an increase 
in the potential to protest among 
younger Russians. Moreover, their de-
mands are mostly focused on particu-
lar hometown issues and not unified by 
any general youth agenda per se.
THE REGIME HAS THE 
POTENTIAL FOR NEARLY 
UNLIMITED SUPPRESSION
Meanwhile, the regime’s methods of 
suppressing protests are well devel-
oped, coordinated, and function on 
different levels. Laws to limit assem-
bly are in place and legal practice has 
been established to support them. In 
particular, the Russian state’s control 
over freedom of assembly has become 
systemic and institutionalized in char-
acter. Pro-Kremlin mass media have 
supported these developments with 
propaganda that labels protests as un-
coordinated, unauthorized, and illegal.
First, administrative obstacles – such 
as tough deadlines for applications – 
have been created for getting demon-
strations authorized, effectively turning 
them into instruments for preventing 
protest. On June 4, 2020, the Russian 
Constitutional Court further limited or-
ganized protest with its decision that 
demonstrations, with few exceptions, 
should only take place in several desig-
nated places, the so-called Hyde Parks.
Second, during protests, all possible 
siloviki forces – that is, members of se-
curity police and other armed forces 
– are used to employ various forms of 
violence against the protesters.
Third, after the protests, those who 
attended can be placed in adminis-
trative detention or even criminally 
prosecuted. During the last eight 
years, legislation related to protests 
was gradually toughened up: penalties 
increased fivefold and involving under-
age protesters was penalized. Being 
found guilty of repeatedly participating 
in uncoordinated actions can result a 
prison term of up to eight years. A case 
in which one is found guilty of organiz-
ing multiple mass riots can result in a 
prison sentence of up to 15 years.
Driven by both institutional interest 
and bureaucratic inertia, institutions 
and ministries have increased the 
number of administrative and criminal 
cases brought against protesters, turn-
ing the judicial system into a means for 
further frightening protesters rather 
than protecting them. Mass detentions 
at protest actions are highly likely to 
result in administrative or criminal 
verdicts. According to the Judicial De-
partment at the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation, 81 percent of all 
cases opened on administrative viola-
tions at demonstrations in 2019 ended 
with a sentence.
In addition, over the last five years, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
the Rosgvardia (an internal paramili-
tary force that reports directly to the 
president) allocated more than seven 
billion rubles for the purchase of spe-
cial non-lethal riot-control equipment 
such as water cannons, stun guns, 
shockproof shields, and pepper sprays. 
This is about the same amount as the 
Moscow authorities intended to allo-
cate to support people who lost their 
jobs because of COVID-19. So far, de-
spite the low official tolerance for 
protests, this plethora of non-lethal 
4,974
CASES HEARD IN  
COURTS IN 2019
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FOUND GUILTY KINDS OF PUNISHMENT
3,571
249
214
11
FINE
ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
MANDATORY LABOR
SIMPLE WARNING
236
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NOT 
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693
OTHER COURT 
DECISIONS
did the courts consider 
it possible to impose a 
penalty lower than that 
foreseen by the law
IN ONLY
31 CASES
Source: Cases on administrative violations at the protest actions under 20.2 Article 20.4. of Russian Admin-
istrative Offence Code in 2019/Data by Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
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weapons have only been used as de-
terrents. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the regime would not put 
them into actual use should it deem it 
necessary.
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
NEEDS A NEW APPROACH 
TO ADDRESS WORSEN-
ING HUMAN RIGHTS
Currently, 24.5 percent of all applica-
tions submitted to the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) come from 
Russia, putting the country in first 
place for human rights violations in 
Europe. Since 2015, however, the Rus-
sian Constitutional Court has been giv-
en the power to ban ECHR decisions if 
they contradict the Russian constitu-
tion. Moreover, one of the suggested 
constitutional amendments also im-
plies the priority of Russia’s national 
law over international treaties. Thus, 
if adopted, the new constitution would 
provide the Kremlin with an escape-
way from its international obligations, 
including on human rights issues.
In the short term, the Russian polit-
ical system is unlikely to change dra-
matically, and the country’s worsening 
human rights situation is also unlikely 
to improve. Consequently, a new, tar-
geted policy approach by the EU to 
address the issue of human rights vi-
olations is needed. Berlin could use 
its chairmanship of the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
from November 2020 through May 
2021, as well as its upcoming EU pres-
idency, as an opportunity to put this 
issue on the agenda. By doing so, Ger-
many would promote fundamental Eu-
ropean values by highlighting positive 
narratives in human rights and ad-
dressing human rights violations.
